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Abstract 
Voluntary mergers of local jurisdictions in Europe gained in importance in the last two 
decades. A debated but rarely analyzed issue in this field is the impact of different local 
characteristics on the probability to merge. The paper contributes to this debate by assessing 
the importance of local determinants in two stages of a merger process. The quantitative 
study of a large-scale territorial reform in the Swiss canton of Fribourg shows that factors 
linked to the functional dimension of local government, such as economic hardship, explain 
the start of a merger process but not the decision taken at the ballots. Here, factors associated 
with the political dimension of local government, such as political power considerations, 
offer a better explanation. These findings might be explained by the variation of different 
political actors’ strength along the two stages of a merger process. 
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Introduction 
In the second half of the 20th century, local government reforms in general – and 
municipal mergers in particular – have become a major issue on the agenda of national 
governments and political scientists alike (Wollmann 2010). In many European countries 
(such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom), boundary reforms of local 
jurisdictions were conducted top-down. Since the 1990s, however, incented voluntary 
municipal mergers implemented bottom-up have become more frequent (Baldersheim and 
Rose 2010b, Dafflon 2013, p. 194). 
Research on these territorial reforms often adopts a comparative macro perspective with 
the aim of explaining the different reform trajectories in different local government systems 
(Baldersheim and Rose 2010c, Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). While it is a very promising 
approach for the explanation of top-down or compulsory mergers, it is less satisfying when 
applied to incented voluntary municipal mergers. For these cases, the macro- has to be 
complemented with a micro perspective to assess under which local conditions municipalities 
voluntarily engage in mergers (Ladner and Steiner 2005, Calciolari, Cristofoli and Macciò 
2013, Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014). 
Studies investigating mergers in general highlight driving and hindering explanatory 
factors that can be connected to a functional and a political dimension of local government 
(Hesse and Sharpe 1991). Large-N or quantitative research predominantly highlights the role 
of economic determinants linked to a functional dimension of local government (e.g. 
Sørensen 2006, Blom-Hansen 2010, Jordahl and Liang 2010). More case study-oriented 
research emphasizes the importance of political factors such as local identification and local 
political influence (Marcal and Svorny 2000, Silberstein and Soguel 2012, Zimmerbauer and 
Paasi 2013). The relative influence and importance of these factors during the merger process 
remains unclear however. 
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In this paper, I quantitatively investigate a ‘wave’ of incented voluntary municipal 
mergers that took place in the Swiss canton of Fribourg between 2000 and 2006 with a 
twofold objective. First, I take on the micro perspective and analyze which local structural 
factors impact merger decisions. Second, analyzing two stages of a merger process (its start 
and its end), I assess when the different local structural determinants matter the most. 
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Theoretical Background: Explaining Voluntary Municipal Mergers 
In this section, I start with an overview of the macro approaches before presenting the 
Swiss case of Fribourg. Building on existing theories, I then present local level functional and 
political determinants for voluntary municipal mergers and finally propose an analytical 
separation of voluntary municipal merger processes into two stages. 
 
Territorial Reforms Across Local Government Systems: Voluntary Municipal 
Mergers and Higher Tier Incentives 
Most research on the causes for territorial reform and municipal mergers in Europe 
starts out from a macro perspective. It is assumed that higher tier governments play an 
important role in the explanation of the presence, absence, and design of territorial reform 
(Kersting and Vetter 2003, Wollmann 2010, Kaiser 2014) and different characteristics of local 
government systems or national and regional political processes are compared (Baldersheim 
and Rose 2010b, Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). Researchers distinguish, broadly speaking, 
two reform paths and outcomes, a Northern and a Southern European one. Large-scale 
municipal mergers resulting in a fundamental restructuration of the local government 
landscape characterize the Northern European path. The Southern European one, in contrast, 
consists of cooperative arrangements between municipalities rather than of local boundary 
modifications (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, pp. 150-52; Hulst and Van Montfort 2007).1 
These variations are linked to different characteristics of local government systems and 
to the strategies of higher government tiers. Hesse and Sharpe (1991) distinguish three groups 
of countries with respect to a functional and a political dimension of local government: the 
Anglo-Saxon, the North-Middle European, and the Southern countries. Local government in 
North-Middle European and Anglo-Saxon countries is functionally strong: It plays an 
important role as implementation agent of higher tier policies and enjoys rather high degrees 
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of local autonomy, while in Southern European countries local government is functionally 
weak (Vetter 2007, p. 97). Its political strength is high, however, just as in North-Middle 
European countries and in contrast to Anglo-Saxon ones: Local jurisdictions serve as places 
for political contestation and as starting points for political careers (Page 1991). Empirically, 
only countries in which the functional dimension is important have experienced large-scale 
territorial reforms. 
The strategies of higher government tiers2 to restructure local government landscapes 
are an important and proximate factor to explain different outcomes. These strategies can be 
top-down or bottom-up. All countries or regions in which large-scale territorial reforms took 
place in the second half of the 20th century (such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark and some 
German states) followed a top-down strategy. With this strategy, local governments, forced to 
merge by the higher tier, have almost no voice in determining their territorial fate 
(Baldersheim and Rose 2010b, p. 6). On the opposite, most Southern European countries3, 
but also countries and states in which large-scale local boundary reforms are absent such as 
Switzerland, Austria and some German states (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, p. 151), 
followed a bottom-up strategy, which implies that local actors voluntarily take the decision to 
merge.  
Two kinds of bottom-up strategies should be distinguished, depending on whether 
mergers are incented by higher tiers or not. Voluntary municipal mergers only occur when 
there’s some form of support from the upper tier (Musilová and Hermánek 2015). Moreover, 
administrative support (e.g. help in legal matters) seems to be a useful supplement but not a 
sufficient condition to trigger a significant number of voluntary mergers: In local government 
systems in which a large-scale territorial reform took place bottom-up, a financial incentive 
by the upper tier was in place (cf. Dafflon 2013, p. 218). The nature of financial incentives 
varies across different systems; some upper tiers relieve merging municipalities from their 
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debts while others grant lump-sum payments (for a detailed overview see Kaiser 2014). What 
is important here is that, irrespective of the exact nature of financial incentives, voluntary 
municipal mergers spread when they are present. 
For a quantitative analysis of voluntary municipal mergers one should, thus, investigate 
a local government system in which the higher tier government pursued a bottom-up strategy 
with financial incentives for municipal mergers. Only this allows comparing the impact of 
different local level determinants and for analyzing them quantitatively. I focus on voluntary 
municipal mergers in the Swiss canton of Fribourg – a case in which a large-scale territorial 
reform took place bottom-up. 
 
The ‘Merger Wave’ in the Swiss Canton of Fribourg 
Between 2000 and 2006, the canton of Fribourg experienced an unprecedented ‘wave’ 
of voluntary municipal mergers. More than half of all municipalities (135) started a merger 
process and a large amount of them (105) merged successfully in the end. From 245 by the 
end of 1999, the number of municipalities dropped to 168 by the end of 2006: 77 
municipalities disappeared from the cantonal map. While some voluntary mergers occurred 
between 1990 and 2000 and have occurred in recent years, the pace cannot be compared to 
this large-scale territorial reform experience (see figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 About Here 
Why did such a vast amount of voluntary mergers occur in this relatively short time 
period? The answer lies in a temporally limited financial incentive provided by the cantonal 
government that was not present before or after this period. With the aim of encouraging 
municipal mergers during a limited period of time (2000-2006), the parliament of the canton 
passed a decree in 1999 introducing lump-sum payments for merging municipalities (Great 
Council of the Canton Fribourg 1999). More precisely, each municipality that merged during 
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this period received CHF 400 (~ $ 270 at the time) per inhabitant weighted by its financial 
capacity.4 A fund was created to finance these payments. Local governments had to contribute 
30% to this fund; the remaining 70% were paid for by the canton. Together with the 
transparent way of calculating the lump-sum payment and the pressure exerted by the 
temporal limitation of the decree, this substantial contribution on the part of the 
municipalities might have constituted an additional incentive: Merging then meant getting the 
lost money back with a little ‘bonus’. This incentive structure allowed for the rare event of a 
large-scale territorial reform that is not based on compulsion.5 
Fribourg’s local government landscape at the beginning of the new millennium was 
very fragmented and small-scaled, even compared to other Swiss cantons: The average 
municipality had 954 inhabitants compared to a Swiss average of 5594. Apart from this 
divergence, the canton of Fribourg can be considered as rather representative of other Swiss 
cantons (see table 1). Both its population- and its area size lie within the standard deviation of 
other Swiss cantons, as well as its population density and the percentage of the settlement 
area. 
TABLE 1 About Here 
Fribourg is, however, a bit less urbanized than other cantons. Historically a rural 
canton, its suburbanization began in the 1970s and 1980s in the course of a general 
movement of people from the cities to the countryside (Kübler 2007). In 2000, Fribourg 
represents a canton with a suburban local government structure that still has rural elements. 
My analysis thus investigates voluntary municipal mergers among suburban jurisdictions, 
little examined compared to mergers between center cities and suburbs (Feiock and Carr 
2000, Savitch and Vogel 2004). The determinants for these two types of mergers do not differ, 
however, apart from the lower salience of a center-periphery dimension in mergers among 
suburban territories (cf. Dur and Staal 2008, Jakobsen and Kjaer 2015). 
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Fribourg local governments – like local governments in all Swiss cantons – are strong 
both in functional and political terms. On the functional dimension, municipalities have a 
dual role as implementation agents of cantonal (and federal) policies and as self-governed 
and autonomous units. In 2000, they accounted for around 30 percent of overall public 
expenditures in Switzerland (Ladner 2010, p. 217). On the political dimension, citizens enjoy 
a wide range of participation rights in local politics. They elect the local executive – a mayor 
plus councilors – and (depending on the municipality) a local parliament. When there is no 
local parliament, citizens participate directly in municipal assemblies, namely town hall 
meetings, with rights equivalent to those of municipal parliaments. In addition, citizens have 
the opportunity to participate in local politics via referenda and other direct democratic means 
(Ladner 2010). The final decision on a merger is always subject to a popular referendum.  
In the Hesse and Sharpe (1991) classification, Switzerland, and thus the canton of 
Fribourg, belongs to the North-Middle European group. Generally, countries and states in this 
group follow the Northern path to territorial reform – top-down and compulsory. While the 
outcome it achieved fits the Northern European type (large-scale territorial reform), the 
canton followed a Southern European reform strategy (inducement of bottom-up voluntary 
mergers). The linguistic structure of Fribourg (see methods section) limits generalization to 
very specific conditions. Yet, when a financial incentive is present, voluntary municipal 
mergers might spread equally in cases belonging to the North-Middle European group 
without a Northern reform strategy, such as Austria, Japan, Finland, as well as some German 
states (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014). 
 
The Role of Local Structures: Functional and Political Determinants for 
Voluntary Municipal Mergers 
The present paper investigates the local determinants influencing the probability to 
merge and the structural conditions under which municipal mergers occur. Since debates on 
9 
 
municipal mergers use to oppose economic or functional reasons and political reasons for 
mergers (Austin 1998), I focus my analysis on different determinants that I link to a 
functional and to a political dimension of local government. While municipal mergers can 
enhance the functional performance of local governments, i.e. their “system capacity”, they 
can threaten the political dimension, e.g. the “effective participation” of local constituencies 
(Dahl and Tufte 1974). Other factors, such as actor constellations and actor strategies within 
municipalities also play an important role in the explanation of municipal mergers (Mévellec 
2009). Yet, analyzing these determinants would require an in-depth study of the different 
municipalities, which lies beyond the quantitative scope of this paper. 
 
The Functional Dimension – Fiscal Stress & Population Size 
An important finding of research on voluntary municipal mergers is that small 
municipalities and municipalities under fiscal stress are more likely to engage in mergers (cf. 
Ladner and Steiner 2005, p. 250; Calciolari, Cristofoli and Macciò 2013; p. 580, Musilová 
and Hermánek 2015). In this part, I propose two hypotheses that take up this finding. 
In their simultaneous function as service providers for local constituencies and as 
implementation agents of higher tiers’ policies, municipalities are under strain from two 
sides. From above, higher government tiers demand output in the form of good policy 
implementation: Growing requirements in terms of implementation quality are complemented 
by an increasing number of tasks that have to be handled at the local level – as a result from 
decentralization and devolution tendencies (Denters and Rose 2005, Hulst and Van Montfort 
2007, p. 3). 
From below, municipalities face demands from their constituencies to provide 
satisfying levels of public services (Bhatti and Hansen 2011, p. 214). In most countries, local 
government is involved in the provision of important welfare state services and “it […] 
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affects, to a greater or lesser extent, the everyday lives of all citizens” (Page 1991, p. 1). 
Residents, thus, have a strong interest in high-quality local public services and local 
governments increasingly perceive them as passive consumers of local politics rather than as 
active citizens participating in politics (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998, Loughlin, Hendriks and 
Lidström 2011). In line with this, citizens’ expectations vis-à-vis local government have 
considerably increased in the last decades and public services are demanded at an ever higher 
standard (Steiner 2002, p. 243). Coping with these demands requires a significant amount of 
economic resources. But what if these resources are not available? 
A prominent answer is institutional reorganization to benefit from scale economies. 
Two possibilities are discussed in the literature: inter-municipal cooperation and municipal 
merger (Baldersheim and Rose 2010b, p. 18). A municipality can cooperate with its neighbors 
to provide a certain public service (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007, p. 6; Swianiewicz 2010, p. 
185) and, thus, increase scale economies and reduce negative externalities (Dur and Staal 
2008, Dafflon 2013, p. 193). The flipside of this strategy is a loss of democratic control over 
the respective services (Rakar, Ticar and Klun 2014), even though the municipality remains 
an autonomous political entity. 
A municipality can also merge with one of its neighbors to tackle its problems. The 
trade-off here is a different one: Instead of losing democratic control over one policy, a 
municipality loses a certain amount of democratic control over all policies by giving up its 
status as an autonomous political actor. Merging thus appears as a viable and ‘rational’ 
strategy when a municipality faces problems in many different policy fields (Soguel 2006). 
Rather than having separate cooperation institutions in each policy area, it is more convenient 
to reconcile them in one integrated body. Since a shortage in economic resources mostly 
affects several areas of local politics, my first hypothesis reads as follows: 
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H1a: A municipality under fiscal stress is more likely to merge than an 
economically wealthy one. 
Small municipalities face challenges similar to poor ones. As indicated above, bigger 
size means lower unit price when it comes to the provision of many public services. Small 
municipalities, therefore, frequently suffer from diseconomies of scale (Sørensen 2006), 
which increases their probability to merge. Yet, population size can also have an impact on 
the probability to merge via another path. Every municipality needs engaged citizens but 
small municipalities frequently experience difficulties in finding willing and capable people 
to occupy positions such as mayor or local executives (Musilová and Hermánek 2015). This 
can be particularly difficult in suburban settings. Commuters are not necessarily oriented 
towards their place of residence, but more towards a whole region or a center near-by 
(Lidström 2013), and they are generally less willing to engage in local politics. Merging can 
contribute to solve this problem: Bigger municipalities have fewer public positions per capita, 
and they become more attractive because the “system capacity” (Dahl and Tufte 1974) grows 
and public office, hence, entails a bigger power share. Therefore, the second hypothesis for 
the functional dimension reads as follows: 
H1b: A small municipality is more likely to merge than a bigger one. 
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The Political Dimension – Local Identity and Political Power 
Local governments do not only provide public services and guarantee the welfare of 
their residents (Page 1991, p. 1), they also have important political functions. In systems with 
politically strong local governments, citizens can participate in various political procedures 
and decide on a number of political issues on the local level (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
2014). Municipalities are the institutionalized territories within which citizens’ local political 
preferences are aggregated (Oliver 2001). Merging implies a modification of local 
boundaries, and consequently a redistribution of political power. This can lead local 
constituencies to oppose mergers (Baldersheim and Rose 2010a, p. 234). Two factors on the 
political dimension are frequently mentioned as hurdles to municipal mergers: Local identity 
and political power. 
Local identity has many different facets and scholars differ quite substantively in their 
approaches to identity (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000 for an overview). In this paper, I 
confine the analysis to one individual and one collective aspect of local identity6: local place 
attachment and local political culture (cf. Paasi 2003, 478). Local place attachment designates 
a feeling of belonging to one’s local community and jurisdiction that “is considered an 
important prerequisite for individual civic and political engagement in the municipal context” 
(Bühlmann 2012, 150). This feeling of belonging needs time to evolve (Manzo 2003, 49) but 
once established, local place attachment is a long-lasting and stable personal trait (Lewicka 
2011). A merger is disruptive to local place attachment, because it transforms important 
objects an individual can identify with, such as the name, flag, or political institutions of a 
municipality (Silberstein and Soguel 2012), along with local boundaries and can thus face 
substantial resistance (Baldersheim and Rose 2010a, p. 242-243).  
Only few studies analyze such claims empirically. In a survey on support for municipal 
detachment in Los Angeles, Marcal and Svorny (2000) find that individuals with strong 
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community ties report lower support for detachment. In an ex-post survey on a municipal 
merger in the Swiss Canton of Fribourg, Silberstein and Soguel (2012) find that strong 
attachment to the former municipalities decreases retrospective merger acceptance. 
Zimmerbauer and Paasi (2013) investigate a municipal merger in Finland and find a strong 
conflict between supporters and opponents of a municipal merger that revolves around local 
identities. These similar findings across different local government contexts suggest that 
strong local place attachment of individuals can indeed represent an obstacle to municipal 
mergers, especially if mergers are subject to popular referenda as they are in Fribourg. 
The second aspect of local identity refers to more collective features that I term local 
political culture. This can be conceived as a shared set of beliefs and values about what local 
government is and what it is supposed to be (Kincaid 1980). These beliefs vary across 
different contexts and different local government systems (Stoker 2011) and they manifest 
themselves in manifold ways. For instance, in some local government systems, participation 
in local politics is deemed more important than in others: “Localized” can be distinguished 
from “delocalized” systems of local government (cf. Sellers et al. 2013, p. 426). Further, the 
politico-institutional structure of local government – whether it is a representative or a direct-
democratic, a strong mayor or a committee system and how different levels of government 
interact – impacts the kind of values that are shared (cf. Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). In a 
direct-democratic system, to give but one example, the value of local autonomy and self-
government is deemed more important than in a representative system, and accordingly local 
political culture is more localized. A localized political culture can hamper municipal 
mergers: The local level is attributed more importance than in a less localized setting, and 
municipal mergers can thus be perceived as a potential threat to local autonomy and local 
democracy (Boudreau 2003, p. 194).  
Combining these two aspects of local identity leads to a third hypothesis: 
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H2a: The stronger local place attachment and the more localized political 
culture are in a municipality, the less likely it is to merge. 
A second factor that needs to be considered for the political dimension of local 
government is political power. Merging changes the existing power distribution in a given 
territory. A social group that was dominant before a merger can become a numeric minority 
after consolidation (cf. Savitch and Vogel 2004). Dur and Staal (2008) argue that municipal 
mergers can create a situation in which the larger of two municipalities exploits the smaller 
one: The larger municipality can use the – now joint – public revenues to provide public 
services, e.g. infrastructure, in its own part of the new municipality only. This creates a 
disincentive to merge with larger municipalities. Moreover, Jakobsen and Kjaer (2015) find 
that after a merger of municipalities with a large population differential, the priorly smaller 
municipalities are over-represented in local councils. They argue that this is due to stronger 
mobilization motivated by the fear of being overruled by the larger parts. We can, thus, 
expect that the fear of being overruled leads small municipalities to refrain from merging 
with large ones in the first place: 
H2b: The smaller the population of a municipality compared to its potential partners, 
the less likely it is to merge. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
While the presented factors are important for explaining municipal mergers, they are 
not exhaustive. I briefly discuss some alternative explanations. First, the geographical 
conditions a municipality is rooted in have to be taken into account. Geography depicts a 
“natural constraint” for a municipality to engage in a merger (Bhatti and Hansen 2011, p. 
215). For instance, it might matter whether a municipality has two or whether it has ten 
neighbors – i.e. potential merger partners – to engage in a merger with. The latter 
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municipality can choose among many more potential partners than the former (Steiner 2002, 
p. 247). It is, thus, important to control for the number of neighbors a municipality has. 
Second, differences in local institutional structures can be important for municipal 
mergers. A first institution to consider is inter-municipal cooperation. As mentioned in the 
argument for H1a, merging and cooperating can be seen as different paths to achieve the same 
goal (Baldersheim and Rose 2010b, p. 18; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, p. 151). In this 
logic, a municipality that took the path of inter-municipal cooperation is less likely to switch 
path and merge than a municipality that has not chosen a certain path yet. Unfortunately, for 
the case at hand, systematic data on inter-municipal cooperation is not available and its 
impact cannot be tested in the analysis. While this is a shortcoming, it does not severely 
obstruct the analysis. On the one hand, inter-municipal cooperation in Switzerland is indeed 
very widespread: A survey of local councilors shows that nearly all municipalities – even big 
cities – cooperate with their neighbors and that the extent of cooperation is independent of 
municipality size (Steiner 2003, p. 558). Accordingly, I assume that the municipalities under 
scrutiny are involved in inter-municipal cooperation to a similar extent. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of inter-municipal cooperation is highly relevant for an analysis of who merges 
with whom, but less so for the present analysis of whether a municipality merges or not. 
A second important institutional feature in the Swiss context is the distinction between 
parliamentary and assembly municipalities (Ladner 2010). While in the first type a permanent 
elected legislative exists in addition to the executive, in the second type the legislative 
function pertains to the municipal assembly, a town hall meeting where citizens gather and 
take decisions. In both types, far-reaching political decisions – such as municipal mergers – 
are subject to local referenda. Nevertheless, municipalities with a parliament might be more 
prone to merge because they already function in a representative logic, while some smaller 
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municipalities might be reluctant to abandon their popular assemblies. Therefore this factor is 
included in the analysis. 
 
Voluntary Municipal Mergers as Two-Stage Processes 
A question that remains largely unexplored in research on voluntary municipal mergers 
is when the different determinants listed above come into play in the course of a merger 
process. Municipal mergers are normally analyzed as singular events: A municipal merger is 
the moment in which some local jurisdictions disappear and another local jurisdiction comes 
into being. This moment can be pinned down very clearly. Existing quantitative 
investigations of municipal mergers do so by focusing on successful mergers only. A binary 
distinction is made between municipalities that merged and those that didn’t (e.g. Ladner and 
Steiner 2005, Bhatti and Hansen 2011). This strategy has a substantial shortcoming: It cannot 
assess the determinants of preceding decisions and it fails to explain unsuccessful merger 
attempts (Dafflon 2003, p. 10). The municipalities that merge in the end are only a subsample 
of those who attempted to merge, and looking at successful mergers only might lead to 
erroneous conclusions about the factors driving these events. 
Only few scholars make propositions to distinguish different stages of merger 
processes. Dafflon (2003, pp. 11-12) identifies three stages of voluntary mergers: A 
preliminary, a preparatory and an institutional stage. In the first two stages, negotiations 
between the different municipalities take place and the terms and the perimeter for the merger 
are defined. In the last stage, the citizens decide at the ballots whether they accept the merger 
proposal or not. Soguel, Beutler and Léchot (2005, p. 4) differentiate four different stages: 
Preliminary analysis, strategic analysis, operational analysis and implementation. Again, the 
first three stages involve negotiations among political and administrative actors of the 
different municipalities while in the fourth stage the referendum on whether or not to merge 
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is held. Finally, in a study of city-county consolidations, Feiock and Carr (2000, p. 228) 
suggest to analyze two stages of merger processes. In the first stage, the issue is put on the 
political agenda; in the second stage, a referendum on the reform is held. 
Because of the quantitative set-up and the lack of more detailed data (see methods 
section), the fine-grained distinction into three or four stages as suggested by some authors 
cannot be reproduced here. For the second objective of this paper – to investigate whether 
and how the impact of different factors varies during a merger process – I build on the two 
stage distinction proposed by Feiock and Carr (2000). 
The two stages of merger processes are thus its start, and its end. This distinction keeps 
complexity relatively low compared to a more fine-grained distinction, but is sufficient to 
assess whether the relevance of different factors changes in the course of a merger. If no 
differences are found with this rough distinction, it is also unlikely to find them with a more 
fine-grained distinction involving more stages. 
 
Methods 
In this section, I start by discussing the dependent variables (start and end of a merger) 
and the data at hand. I then describe the operationalization of the independent variables, 
namely fiscal stress, population size, local place attachment, local political culture and 
political power. Finally, I explain my choice of a cross-sectional model instead of a 
longitudinal one. 
 
Dependent Variables – The Start and the End of a Merger 
As discussed in the previous section, a municipal merger should not be treated as an 
event that occurs at one point in time but as a dynamic process whose different steps should 
be analyzed. In my definition, a municipality was involved in a merger between 2000 and 
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2006 if a merger proposal appeared in administrative documents during that time. This 
appearance corresponds to the start of the process. In the Swiss canton of Fribourg, all 
municipalities submit their merger proposals to the cantonal government, which has to 
formally approve it. In my analysis, this submission depicts the start of a merger process.7 
The first binary outcome variable in the dataset distinguishes between municipalities that 
submitted a merger proposal to the cantonal government, and, thus, made a merger attempt, 
and those that did not. 
This indicator doesn’t contain any information about the success or failure of the 
project. That piece of information comes from the second stage, namely the end of a merger 
process. This stage corresponds to a municipality’s final decision on the merger and is 
empirically measured via the outcome of the local referendum. In the canton of Fribourg, 
mergers need the approval by local referenda in all involved municipalities and the final 
decision lies with local constituencies.8 The second dependent variable, thus, consists of a 
binary distinction into municipalities deciding in favor and those deciding against merging, 
and is cast at the ballots. Put differently, it distinguishes municipalities that accepted from 
those that did not accept a merger. 
 
Independent Variables – Fiscal Stress, Population Size, Local Identity and 
Political Power 
A list of descriptive statistics for all variables, grouped by the two dependent variables, 
can be found in tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. In what follows, I discuss the 
operationalization of the main independent variables.9 
Functional Determinants 
Fiscal stress: Two indicators are used to assess the economic situation of a 
municipality. The first is the financial capacity index. It is used by the Fribourg 
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administration to determine the fiscal strength of the canton’s municipalities, and mainly 
serves as the calculation base for the grants from intra-cantonal fiscal equalization (Mischler 
2009, pp. 158-60). There are two separate elements to the financial capacity index: Local 
fiscal resources and local financial needs (Great Council of the Canton Fribourg 1989, Art. 3-
8). For each of these indicators, a mean value that depicts the index mean of 100.00 is 
calculated. All the municipalities are then assigned values below or above 100.00 
corresponding to their values on these indicators. Index values above 100.00 indicate above-
average capacity. While this indicator measures structural features of a municipality’s 
situation, it does not account for its legacy. High expenditures in the past might also lead to 
fiscal stress, even though the tax base is solid. Therefore, in addition to the financial capacity 
index, a municipality’s net indebtedness per capita will be used as a second indicator to 
account for this. 
Population Size: Population size is measured as the number of inhabitants that lived in 
a municipality in the year 1999. The natural logarithm is taken to normalize the distribution 
of this variable. 
Political Determinants 
Local Identity: Measuring the attachment of an individual to groups, institutions or 
territories is a challenging task (Lewicka 2011). Measuring the feelings of belonging of a 
whole municipality is even more difficult and can only be approximated, especially in the 
absence of survey data. Considering that the duration of residence was found to be a good 
predictor of local place attachment in numerous studies (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974, 
Lackwoska and Mikuła 2015, Magre, Vallbé and Tomàs 2016) (after four to six years of 
living in one place, local place attachment increases significantly (Magre, Vallbé and Tomàs 
2016)), I use the percentage of residents living in a municipality for five years or longer in the 
year 2000 to approximate citizens’ attachment to their municipality. 
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In order to distinguish between more and less localized political cultures for measuring 
the collective aspect of local identity, I leverage a specific feature of the canton of Fribourg: 
Its bilingualism. Fribourg is one of the few Swiss cantons that are bilingual, i.e. consist of 
French- and German-speaking parts, and municipalities can be unambiguously assigned to 
one or the other language. This feature is useful because the Swiss French and the Swiss 
German culture differ in the ways different government levels are perceived (Meier-Dallach 
and Hohermuth 2003). The Swiss French culture is more oriented towards the cantonal level, 
whereas the Swiss German one emphasizes the role of the local level as well. Further, in the 
Swiss French part, representative democracy is more important than in the Swiss German part 
(Ladner 2010, p. 213). In a representative culture, citizens are often less involved and 
engaged than in a direct-democratic culture, which can explain the lower importance of the 
local level. I thus take German-speaking municipalities to display a more localized political 
culture than French-speaking ones, assuming that this collective aspect of local identity is 
stronger in the former. 
Political Power: For the first stage of a merger, political power is measured as the ratio 
of a municipality’s population size and the average population size of potential merger 
partners (=neighbors). Because we do not know which municipalities become partners before 
the start of a merger, the average of the neighbors is the most reliable indicator. For the end of 
a merger, political power is measured as the ratio of a municipality’s population size and the 
size of the new municipality. In addition, a dummy variable is included: It measures whether 
a municipality would be incorporated (if it is much smaller than the main municipality), 
would amalgamate (if all municipalities are approximately the same size), or would 
incorporate others (if it is much bigger than the other municipalities). This variable captures 
not only the relation between a municipality and the total of the others, but also its role in a 
merger. 
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Modeling – Cross-Sectional Logistic Regression Analysis 
Two separate logistic regression models investigate the impact of the different 
determinants cross-sectionally. This choice of methods might seem surprising, since the 
second aim of the paper is to investigate different subsequent stages of a merger and the data 
thus display a temporal dimension. Yet, this choice can be justified on different grounds. 
Standard time-series or panel analysis procedures are not suitable for this type of data, 
since observations drop out in the course of time. This problem could be handled by event 
history models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004), but these models have their own 
requirements, which are not reconcilable with the case at hand. Most importantly, one of the 
two investigated outcome variables, namely starting a merger, cannot be pinned down to one 
point in time. A municipality can be involved in a merger for more than one time period, e.g. 
a year, which would then lead to an over-estimation of the effects of certain characteristics. 
Second, a newly created municipality joining the dataset at time t is non-independent from 
disappearing municipalities at time t-1, if the latter formed the new municipality. While there 
are possibilities to account for within-unit temporal dependencies, there is no obvious 
solution for between-unit temporal dependencies (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, pp. 
114-16). Finally, event history analysis requires longitudinal data. However, such data is not 
available for all the needed indicators.  
Due to these limitations, I selected a cross-sectional modeling strategy. The year 2000 
serves as the base year for all the independent variables. The variable ‘merger attempt’ 
measures whether a municipality was involved in a merger during the period 2000-2006, and 
the variable ‘merger acceptance’ measures whether an involved municipality accepted the 
merger in this period at the ballots. Such a proceeding certainly can be criticized on various 
grounds. Yet, it is justifiable by two arguments. First, in substantive terms, this paper does not 
aim at explaining when an event occurred during the six-year period but only whether it 
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occurred. Second, it focuses on structural indicators that do not vary a lot over such a short 
time period. In this sense, the census data from 2000 can be considered as depicting a 
snapshot of the longitudinal picture. A longitudinal correlation analysis of indicators for 
which longitudinal data was available supports this claim: The year 2000 can serve as a proxy 
for other years as well.10 Therefore, these structural indicators could be considered as time-
invariant covariates, which would render a longitudinal analysis obsolete. 
Logistic regression models are estimated for the two binary outcome variables (cf. 
Long 1997, pp. 53-54). The model for the first outcome variable, ‘merger attempt’, includes 
all municipalities that existed in the canton of Fribourg in the year 2000. The model for the 
second outcome variable, ‘merger acceptance’, includes only the municipalities with a 
positive outcome in the first outcome variable – namely those that attempted to merge. The 
units of analysis for the second outcome variable are thus a subsample of those for the first 
one. 
 
Results 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first one, I assess the impact of functional 
and political determinants for the probability to start a merger. I then analyze which of these 
factors are associated with a successful merger. 
 
Attempting to Merge 
Recall the four hypotheses that will be tested: The first two hypotheses, H1a and H1b, 
state that functional pressures, i.e. fiscal stress and small population size, render a merger 
attempt more likely. The second two hypotheses H2a and H2b assume that political 
determinants, i.e. local place attachment and localized political culture as well as power 
considerations, render it less likely. 
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Table 2 depicts different models that assess the probability to start a merger. It includes 
a baseline model with control variables only, two separate models for the functional and the 
political hypotheses and a full model integrating all predictors.  
TABLE 2 About Here 
Neither the number of neighbors nor parliamentary representation has a significant 
impact on the probability to start a merger in the full model. On the contrary, financial 
capacity, debt / capita and population size significantly impact the probability to merge in the 
expected way. Low financial capacity and a small population size increase the probability to 
make a merger attempt, while a lower debt / capita increases it.11 However, in the full model, 
when political determinants are included, this indicator is not significant anymore. 
The results for the political determinants are less straightforward. The indicator for 
local political culture, namely language, has a strong impact on the probability to start a 
merger. In line with my expectations, German-speaking municipalities are much less likely to 
start a merger than French-speaking ones. But the coefficients for the share of long-term 
residents on the total population and the population size of a municipality compared to its 
neighbors are not very robust. Against initial expectations, a higher share of long-term 
residents positively impacts the probability to start a merger – but this effect is not significant 
in the full model. The effect for the population ratio is in line with theoretical expectations, 
but it is only marginally significant in the full model. Comparing the pseudo-R2s of the 
functional and the political models, one can see that the functional model performs slightly 
better at explaining the outcome. But as the pseudo-R2 from the full model shows, it is the 
combination of both functional and political determinants that delivers the best results. 
The most important results of the full model are summarized graphically in figure 2. It 
shows the predicted probabilities to start a merger for different levels of financial capacity 
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and population size in the two language contexts, holding all other variables constant at their 
mean. 
FIGURE 2 About Here 
The figure highlights strong differences between German- and French-speaking 
municipalities. A German-speaking municipality is nearly 40% less likely to make a merger 
attempt than a French-speaking one. The effects of financial capacity and population size are 
roughly the same across the two groups. A municipality from the smallest quartile has a 20% 
higher chance to start a merger than a municipality from the largest quartile. Financial 
capacity has a similarly strong effect for the French-speaking municipalities, but a bit less so 
for German-speaking municipalities. 
In line with hypotheses H1a and H1b, poor and small municipalities are more likely to 
make a merger attempt than wealthy and large ones. Furthermore, local political culture 
strongly determines the probability to start a merger, which corroborates part of H2a. 
 
Accepting a Merger 
Are the effects of the different indicators similar when a merger ends? Table 3 shows 
the different logistic regression models to assess the decision taken at the ballots, for which 
the control variables are not included anymore. The number of neighbors does not matter at 
this stage because partners are already found, and there is only one municipality with a 
parliament in the subsample for this stage, which leads to the exclusion of these variables.12 
To gauge size differences between different municipalities, two additional variables are 
included: Whether a municipality would be amalgamating (a merger among equally sized 
municipalities), or whether it would be incorporating other municipalities (i.e. dominate the 
new municipality in terms of population size). 
TABLE 3 About Here 
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In contrast to the first stage, functional determinants appear to be less important. Only 
population size still has a significant and negative effect on accepting a merger at the ballots. 
Fiscal stress does not seem to be linked to the outcome of local referenda on mergers and H1a 
has to be rejected for this stage.  
Again, the results for the political determinants are less straightforward. In contrast to 
table 2, the indicator for local political culture is not significant anymore. Neither is the 
variable that distinguishes amalgamating from incorporating and incorporated municipalities. 
The sign of the indicator for local place attachment is in line with theoretical expectations but 
only significant in the full model. The opposite is true for the population ratio: It is significant 
only in the political model, but the sign contradicts the theoretical expectation from H2b. This 
could be explained by the fact that it captures part of the effect of population size. The 
inclusion of the latter renders the population ratio insignificant, and these two variables are 
quite strongly correlated.13 Finally, the political and the full model show a significant and 
positive effect on the probability to accept a merger for municipalities that incorporate other 
municipalities, which is in line with H2b. The goodness-of-fit statistics of the different models 
show that the full model has a much higher pseudo-R2 than the political model and that the 
political model is not significant. Further interpretation should, thus, not rely too much on the 
political model. 
Figure 3 summarizes the most important determinants from the full model graphically. 
It visualizes an interesting finding: An increase in population size and in the share of long-
term residents only negatively affects the probability to accept a merger in municipalities that 
would amalgamate or be incorporated by others, but not in those that incorporate others. 
Furthermore, the negative effect of population size is stronger for municipalities with a higher 
share of long-term residents.14 These findings at least partially corroborate H1b, H2a and H2b.  
FIGURE 3 About Here 
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Discussion: Explaining Voluntary Municipal Mergers as Two-Stage Decisions 
The results show that both functional and political considerations matter for voluntary 
municipal mergers. However, these different factors vary in their importance over the course 
of a merger. While fiscal stress and local political culture matter for starting a merger process, 
local place attachment and power considerations influence its success or failure. Only 
population size has a significant negative effect on the probability of attempting to merge and 
accepting a merger. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that different actors play the dominant role 
in the two stages of a merger process. The decision to start a merger lies in the hands of local 
elites; starting a merger is predominantly a negotiation process among local elected officials 
(Ladner and Steiner 2005, p. 251). In Switzerland, usually it’s the local executives who get 
into contact with one another to start a merger process. In their day-to-day experience, local 
elites are frequently confronted with the lack of local resources and they are sensitive to 
‘technocratic’ solutions that promise to reduce fiscal stress (Boudreau 2003). Discourses on 
municipal mergers highlight their potential for enhancing economies of scale and reducing 
demographic pressures (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, pp. 169-71). Further, local elites also 
represent a certain local culture. When this local culture ascribes less importance to the local 
compared to other levels of government, as it is the case for the French-speaking 
municipalities in Switzerland, representatives might be more prone to consider a merger as a 
solution for local fiscal and demographic pressures. However, the findings only show weak 
evidence for the role of power considerations in starting a merger. This is a surprising result 
in the light of research that highlights the role of local elites’ power considerations in 
territorial reforms (Savitch and Vogel 2004, p. 762). Here, a deeper analysis is due, which, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The end, i.e. the final acceptance, of a merger is subject to a local referendum. Here, the 
dominant actors are the citizens of the affected jurisdictions deciding at the ballots. The 
results suggest that they base their decision on slightly different reasons compared to elected 
officials. Power considerations seem to matter particularly. Citizens in municipalities that 
would incorporate other municipalities do not oppose this reform, in contrast to citizens in 
municipalities whose merger would lead to ‘co-dominion’ or to being ‘subordinate’ to another 
municipality. This can be explained by a fear of losing power and voice (Jakobsen and Kjaer 
2015), and is in line with research that highlights the importance of representative and 
participatory aspects in citizens’ evaluation of local democracy (Denters 2014 , p. 162). Local 
place attachment also only appears to impact the decision in municipalities that would 
amalgamate or would be incorporated. This result suggests that individuals’ local place 
attachment becomes salient in situations in which they could lose out. 
Finally, the findings for the effect of population size on the acceptance of a merger 
point to potential trade-offs that exist between functional and political factors. Figure 3 shows 
that local place attachment only produces a strong negative effect once a municipality 
exceeds a certain size. A possible explanation for this result is that citizens in small 
municipalities give more weight to the functional pressure (and its potential solution through 
a merger) than to their local place attachment. The awareness of these functional pressures 
might also be reinforced by the frequent interactions between local elites and citizens in small 
jurisdictions (Oliver 2000). When the size increases, functional pressures are reduced and 
there is more room for political considerations. 
In sum, the results suggest that it is important to disentangle different decision stages in 
the course of a merger. Different paths might lead to the decision to start and to successfully 
end a merger: Functional determinants are predominantly linked to the probability of starting 
a merger, while political determinants play a role for both starting and ending a merger. 
28 
 
Distinguishing between merger attempts that failed and those that succeeded allows for 
additional insights in local government mergers which remain concealed to studies 
distinguishing only between merged and non-merged municipalities. It offers a new 
perspective on voluntary municipal mergers and draws a more nuanced picture of the 
different structural determinants and their respective relevance. 
 
Conclusion 
In research on local territorial reforms there’s a dearth of studies investigating the local 
determinants for voluntary municipal mergers and even less is known about their impact in 
different stages of a merger. This study is a first attempt to fill this gap. I investigate a large-
scale territorial reform of incented voluntary municipal mergers that took place in the Swiss 
canton of Fribourg between 2000 and 2006 and analyze which functional and political 
determinants render the start and the successful end of a merger process more or less likely.  
The results suggest that different paths might lead to these two different outcomes. 
Functional factors appear to be especially relevant for starting a merger process, and they 
could be understood as triggers (Calciolari, Cristofoli and Macciò 2013, p. 580). In contrast, 
political factors especially play a role at the end of the process, when the final decision on the 
merger is taken. These differences could be explained by the varying importance of different 
actors and their distinctive rationales or mindsets (cf. Boudreau 2003). At the outset of a 
merger process, local elites – representatives and officials – dominate the process, while the 
final decision is taken at the ballots by the citizens. 
These findings have important implications for the discussion on municipal mergers. 
First, they indicate that local constituencies are not only consumers of local services, but that 
they especially value the political dimension of local governments. This corroborates a recent 
finding by Denters (2014) for the Dutch case. Second, the Swiss canton of Fribourg is a good 
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example for the efficacy of financial incentives in triggering voluntary mergers: More than 
40% of the municipalities that existed in 2000 had successfully merged by 2006. Reformers 
in other countries and regions can learn from this example. Especially in suburban territories 
of local government systems that belong to the North-Middle European group (Hesse and 
Sharpe 1991) similar local reactions can be expected once a financial incentive is 
introduced.15 Moreover, the case of Fribourg demonstrates that large-scale territorial reforms 
are possible without compulsion from higher government tiers: it combines a Southern 
European reform path with a Northern European outcome (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). 
The present study has several limitations. First, it cannot test the underlying 
mechanisms of the different correlations, due to its quantitative set-up and its focus on 
structural factors at the municipal level. Especially the dynamics between the start of a 
merger and the final decision at the ballots require closer examination. To gain a more 
detailed picture of local merger processes and their mechanisms, a more ‘actor-centered’ view 
would be an interesting next step. Second, the study focuses on a specific local government 
system in a specific time period because the large-scale territorial reform in Fribourg offers 
the rare opportunity to analyze the local correlates of voluntary municipal mergers 
quantitatively. Identifying and analyzing additional large-scale bottom-up reforms in other 
local government systems is therefore an important next step. 
Future research can make several contributions. To integrate structural and actor-
centered perspectives, nested analysis approaches that assess the issue both quantitatively and 
qualitatively might be beneficial (Rohlfing 2008). Moreover, scholars can also engage in a 
more in-depth theorizing and exploration of potential causal pathways that explain different 
stages in a merger. The present binary distinction between start and end of a merger is a first 
proposition to be tested, altered and extended by other scholars in different contexts. 
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Appendix 
TABLE A.1: Descriptive Statistics (Merger Attempt) 
 N MEAN P50 P25 P75 SD MIN MAX 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE         
Merger Attempt (=1) 237 .53 1 0 1 .50 0 1 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES         
Controls         
Number of Neighbours 237 4.81 5 4 6 1.81 1 11 
Parliament (=1) 237 .04 0 0 0 .19 0 1 
Fiscal stress         
Financial Capacity 237 88.41 83.50 76.79 92.97 22.23 55.96 235.51 
Debt / Capita 237 -2732 -2885 -4848 -811 4569 -21447 27852 
Log(Population) 237 6.15 6.08 5.52 6.79 1.05 3.87 10.36 
Local Identity         
Residents > 5 years / Total 
Population 237 .71 .71 .66 .75 .07 .32 .88 
German Municipality (=1) 237 .17 0 0 0 .38 0 1 
Political Power         
Population/Average of 
Neighbors 237 -1.74 -1.41 -2.97 1.15 5.50 -58.51 17.42 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Department of Statistics of the Canton Fribourg (2013a, 2013b), Department of 
Municipalities of the Canton Fribourg (2013).  
P50=median, P25=25th percentile, P75=75th percentile, SD=Standard Deviation, MIN=Minimum, MAX=Maximum. 
 
TABLE A.2: Descriptive Statistics (Merger Acceptance) 
 N MEAN P50 P25 P75 SD MIN MAX 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE         
Merger Acceptance (=1) 131 .91 1 1 1 .27 0 1 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES         
Controls         
Parliament (=1) 131 .01 0 0 0 .09 0 1 
Fiscal stress         
Financial Capacity 131 81.44 79.36 73.29 88.09 11.90 55.96 122.36 
Debt / Capita 131 -3136 -2720 -4753 -915 3998 -21447 5712 
Log(Population) 131 5.83 5.77 5.31 6.36 .90 3.87 9.29 
Local Identity         
Residents > 5 years / Total 
Population 131 .72 .72 .67 .76 .08 .33 .88 
German Municipality (=1) 131 .07 0 0 0 .25 0 1 
Political Power         
Population/Population New 
Municipality 131 .34 .30 .18 .49 .22 .03 .97 
Amalgamating (=1) 131 .49 0 0 1 .50 0 1 
Incorporating (=1) 131 .18 0 0 0 .38 0 1 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Department of Statistics of the Canton Fribourg (2013a, 2013b), Department of 
Municipalities of the Canton Fribourg (2013).  
P50=median, P25=25th percentile, P75=75th percentile, SD=Standard Deviation, MIN=Minimum, MAX=Maximum. 
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TABLE A.3: Correlation Analysis (Merger Attempt) 
 Number 
of 
Neighbors 
Financial 
Capacity 
Debt / 
Capita 
Log 
(Population) 
Residents > 5 
years / Total 
Population 
Population / 
Average of 
Neighbors 
Financial 
Capacity -.018 --     
Debt / Capita .022 .321 --    
Log(Population) .276 .329 -.264 --   
Residents > 5 
years / Total 
Population 
.126 -.296 -.083 -.044 --  
Population / 
Average of 
Neighbors 
.203 -.159 -.352 .490 .089 -- 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Department of Statistics of the Canton Fribourg (2013a, 2013b), Department of 
Municipalities of the Canton Fribourg (2013). Numbers are Pearson’s r, N=237. 
 
TABLE A.4: Correlation Analysis (Merger Acceptance) 
 Financial 
Capacity 
Debt / 
Capita 
Log 
(Population) 
Residents > 5 
years / Total 
Population 
Population / 
Population New 
Municipality 
Debt / Capita -.121 --    
Log(Population) .582 -.153 --   
Residents > 5 
years / Total 
Population 
-.292 .033 -.113 --  
Population / 
Population New 
Municipality 
.415 -.189 .715 -.165 -- 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Department of Statistics of the Canton Fribourg (2013a, 2013b), Department of 
Municipalities of the Canton Fribourg (2013). Numbers are Pearson’s r, N=131. 
 
 
Notes 
1 The exception from the Southern European reform path is Greece, where large-scale territorial reforms of local 
government took place in the years 1998 and 2010 (Hlepas 2010). 
2 Comparative studies of local government reforms normally compare countries, i.e. national levels, to each 
other. While this suits unitary states, for federal states this is problematic: In some cases, e.g. Switzerland, the 
national level is not concerned with any local legislation and the member states have full discretion on how to 
organize their territory: Swiss cantons are the guarantors of municipal autonomy, which makes them the relevant 
government level to look at (Kübler and Ladner 2003, p. 139). For these cases, one should thus investigate the 
member state level which can be compared to the national level in unitary states. 
3 Greece being the exception (see endnote 1). There, territorial reform was conducted top-down by the 
respective national governments (Hlepas 2010). 
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4 The formula for calculating the payment is as follows: ସ଴଴ൈ௉௢௣௨௟௔௧௜௢௡೔ி௜௡௔௡௖௜௔௟ ஼௔௣௔௖௜௧௬೔ ൌ ܮݑ݉݌ െ ܵݑ݉ ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜	; 	ሺ݅|݅ ൑ 1500ሻ. See 
methods section for details on financial capacity. 
5 A few other Swiss cantons also experienced large-scale territorial reforms. One of them is the canton of Ticino 
in Southern Switzerland: Almost half of all municipalities disappeared between 2000 and 2010 (Calciolari, 
Cristofoli and Macciò 2013). While generally following a bottom-up approach, some municipalities were forced 
to merge and the boundary changes were not entirely voluntary. Another example is the canton of Glarus, which 
reduced the number of its municipalities from 25 to 3 in 2011. Yet, this reform was conducted top-down. In 
other Swiss cantons, voluntary mergers take place as well but in a rather incremental way. Nevertheless, a slow 
dynamic towards more mergers is observable since the year 2000 (Kaiser 2014). 
6 This choice obviously does not cover all dimensions of local identity and, for example, neglects more 
constructivist approaches to this concept (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 11-14). Yet, the focus on an 
individual and more psychological component and a more group-oriented and cultural component is what is 
possible within the limits of this quantitative study. 
7 With the submission of the merger proposal, the merger project and the involved municipalities appear in the 
cantonal statistics, before they do not. This criterion ensures comparability, it is the earliest and only point in a 
merger process, for which comparable data is available. The second event in a merger process for which 
comparable data is available, is the outcome of the local referenda. Unfortunately, there’s no systematic data in 
between these two time points that would allow for a quantitative analysis. 
8 In principle, this distinction can also be applied to local government systems in which the decision on a 
voluntary merger is not subject to a referendum but is made by a local parliament or a similar representative 
institution. 
9 The operationalization of the control variables is straightforward and will therefore not be discussed here. 
10 Pearson’s r is high or very high (> 0.9) for these indicators over a 5 year period, which means that there is no 
substantive variation over time. 
11 The variable debt / capita ranges from -21448 to +27853 CHF. Negative values mean that a municipality is 
indebted, while positive values mean that there are surpluses. Thus, an increase in the variable debt / capita 
means a decrease in debt. 
12 This means that the dependent variable does not vary for municipalities with parliaments: The one 
municipality that has a parliament and was involved in a merger also accepted it in the end. In the logistic 
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regression model, this leads to the exclusion of the variable because its predictive power is perfect; all 
municipalities with a parliament accepted a merger (although it is only one municipality). 
13 A correlation analysis of the independent variables (see table A.4 in the appendix) shows that there is a strong 
positive correlation between the indicators ‘log(population)’ and ‘population / population new municipality’. 
14 This suggests an interaction effect between these different variables. However, a re-estimation of the full 
model with different interaction effects did not yield significant results. 
15 Generalization to other local government contexts is, however, limited by the specific linguistic structure of 
the canton of Fribourg. Therefore, the findings for the political dimension do not travel well to other contexts. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: The Canton of Fribourg in Comparison 
 Fribourg Swiss Cantons 
MEAN  P50 P25 P75 
Nr. of Municipalities 245 111 81 22 169 
Inhabitants/Municipality 945 5594 2573 1757 4631 
Area in km2 1671 1588 873 347 1714 
% Settled Area 7.3 11.2 8.0 4.9 11.9 
Population 250400 285200 210395 70265 346000 
Inhabitants/km2 149.9 179.6 205.4 93.8 296.5 
% Population > 64 13.1 15.8 15.8 14.5 16.8 
% Urban Population 55.3 73.3 65.9 49.6 84.7 
% Tertiary Education 19.7 21.5 19.0 16.8 20.8 
Tax Index1 130.3 107.6 112.5 94.5 125.4 
Debt / Capita (CHF) 4500 8900 6087 4600 8900 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2015). Data for the year 2000. 
1 Federal Tax=100. 
P50=Median, P25=25th percentile, P75=75th percentile. 
 
TABLE 2: Determinants for Merger Attempt (=1) 
 Baseline Model 
Functional 
Model 
Political 
Model 
Full  
Model 
 β 
(p > z) 
β 
(p > z) 
β 
(p > z) 
β 
(p > z) 
Constant -.291 6.552*** -3.797** 4.241* (.440) (.000) (.016) (.077) 
CONTROLS     
Number of Neighbors .102 .209** .013 .119 (.171) (.018) (.870) (.198) 
Parliament (=1) -2.400** -.017 -2.841** -1.294 (.026) (.988) (.012) (.311) 
FUNCTIONAL DETERMINANTS     
Financial Capacity  -.033***  -.024*  (.004)  (.053) 
Debt / Capita  -.000*  -.000  (.057)  (.353) 
Log(Population)  -.778***  -.810***  (.000)  (.002) 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS     
Residents > 5 years / 
Total Population 
  6.174*** 3.865 
  (.005) (.109) 
German Municipality (=1)   -2.218*** -1.546***   (.000) (.002) 
Own Population /  
Average of Neighbors 
  .036 .112* 
  (.252) (.072) 
N 237 237 237 237 
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) .028 .169 .144 .230 
LR Chi2 9.275*** 55.330*** 47.295*** 75.264*** 
p > Chi2 .009 .000 .000 .000 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Department of Statistics of the Canton Fribourg (2013a, 2013b), Department 
of Municipalities of the Canton Fribourg (2013). Coefficients are obtained from binary logistic regression with 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. p-values in parentheses.  
*=significant with 90% confidence, **=significant with 95% confidence, ***=significant with 99% confidence. 
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TABLE 3: Determinants for Merger Acceptance (=1) 
 Functional 
Model 
Political 
Model 
Full 
Model 
 β 
(p > z) 
β 
(p > z) 
β 
(p > z) 
Constant 8.293*** 8.693** 26.747*** (.001) (.043) (.003) 
FUNCTIONAL DETERMINANTS    
Financial Capacity .001  -.027 (.966)  (.500) 
Debt / Capita -.000  -.000 (.678)  (.614) 
Log(Population) -1.000**  -1.657** (.039)  (.016) 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS    
Residents > 5 years /  
Total Population 
 -6.119 -15.319* 
 (.256) (.060) 
German Municipality (=1)  -.792 -3.291  (.526) (.334) 
Population / 
Population New Municipality 
 -6.013** -4.572 
 (.017) (.115) 
Amalgamating (=1)  -.011 -.222  (.990) (.832) 
Incorporating (=1)  3.523* 4.512**  (.057) (.048) 
N 131 131 131 
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) .106 .113 .274 
LR Chi2 8.036** 8.504 20.72*** 
p > Chi2 .045 .131 .007 
Note: Own Calculations. Data Source: Department of Statistics of the Canton Fribourg (2013a, 
2013b), Department of Municipalities of the Canton Fribourg (2013). Coefficients are obtained from 
binary logistic regression with Maximum Likelihood Estimation. p-values in parentheses. 
*=significant with 90% confidence, **=significant with 95% confidence, ***=significant with 99% 
confidence 
 
FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: Voluntary Municipal Mergers in the Canton of Fribourg 1990-2015 
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FIGURE 2: Determinants for Attempting to Merge 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Determinants for Accepting a Merger 
 
 
